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The acceleration of productivity growth during the latter half of the 1990s was both the 
defining economic event of the decade and a major topic of debate among Federal 
Reserve policymakers. A key aspect of the debate was the conflict between incoming 
aggregate data, which initially suggested little productivity gain, and anecdotal firm-level 
evidence which hinted at an acceleration. Some FOMC members feared an overheating 
economy and higher inflation; others, including the Chairman, argued that revolutionary 
increases in productivity were occurring and the Committee should not prematurely forgo 
significant future gains in real income by tightening policy. We review the difficulty of 
measuring productivity during periods of rapid quality change, the large magnitude of 
subsequent data revisions during the 1990s, and, from FOMC transcripts, the 
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1. The Productivity Acceleration 
During the last decade, a consensus has arisen among economists that trend 
growth rates for potential real output and labor productivity increased approximately a 
decade ago, and that the cause was an increase in the rate of decrease of semi-conductor 
prices.1  In this study, we discuss measurement issues and examine revisions to the last 
decade’s labor productivity data.  We find that the revisions have been large, in some 
cases large enough to fully reverse initial preliminary conclusions regarding productivity 
growth slowdowns and accelerations.  We examine the cautious response of 
policymakers to these incoming, uncertain, preliminary productivity data. 
Because the 1990s acceleration of labor productivity was unforeseen and  
challenged extant views, its recognition was delayed.  Typical is the 1996 Economic 
Report of the President, prepared during 1995.  In the report, the Council of Economic 
Advisers projected that labor productivity in the private nonfarm business sector would 
increase at an average annual rate of 1.2 percent from the third quarter of 1995 to the end 
of 2002.  This estimate extrapolated recent experience: from 1973 to 1995 productivity 
had grown at an average annual rate of 1.4 percent.  Initial productivity measurements 
published during 1995 and 1996 were consistent with the Council’s forecast, and did not 
signal an increase in productivity growth.  Today’s revised data shows that productivity 
growth had started to increase even before 1995.  The incoming data during 1995 and 
1996 clashed with widespread anecdotal firm-level evidence that spending on 
information and communication technology equipment was increasing productivity.  A 
lively debate ensued, among private analysts and policymakers.  To some analysts, the 
                                                           
1 Some analysts have labeled this increase as the beginning of the “New Economy” era.        
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productivity acceleration was no more than a cyclical response to more robust economic 
activity.  But, at the same time, large investments in information and communication 
technology (ICT) equipment could not be ignored.2  Analysts quickly identified decreases 
in semi-conductor prices, and the prices of business equipment built with them, as the 
primary cause of the productivity acceleration.  But, prices also had fallen in the past—
would rapid price decreases be sustained?  Further, some analysts asked if the increased 
investment in ICT was largely a change in the type of producers’ durable equipment 
being purchased, rather than a genuine capital deepening.  A typical after-the-fact 
assessment is Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2002):   “… the story begins with an increase in 
total factor productivity growth in the IT-producing sectors (computer hardware, 
software, and telecommunications), which led to falling relative prices and induced 
capital deepening in IT equipment.” 
The 2001 recession dispelled doubt regarding the staying power of the 
productivity acceleration.  During the recession, productivity growth defied historical 
experience by increasing rather than decreasing, which was contrary to predictions from 
the historical record.3  By 2001, the Council of Economic Advisors had increased its 
projection of the annual growth of structural labor productivity to 2.3 percent per year.  
Other forecasters, including many included in Blue Chip Economic Indicators and the 
                                                           
2 Such changes are not confined to the United States.  Pilat (2001), Colecchia (2002), Colecchia and 
Schreyer (2002), and Baudchon (2002) survey the OECD countries. Armstrong et al. (2002) examine the 
Canadian experience. 
3 As the discussion in Edge, Laubach and Williams (2004) indicates, in 1997 Princeton University 
Professor Alan Blinder estimated that trend labor productivity growth was effectively its average since 
1974, 1.1 percent. Further, in 1999 Northwestern University Professor Robert Gordon estimated a trend 
rate of growth of 1.85 percent; he then subsequently revised this up to 2.25 percent in 2000, and then to 2.5 
percent in 2003.  Interested readers also should compare Gordon (2000) and Gordon (2003).  In his earlier 
writings, Gordon argued that productivity had not accelerated in nearly 90 percent of the economy and that 
trend growth of total factor productivity had actually decelerated.  The passage of time, and revisions to the        
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Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, were even 
more optimistic.4  Yet, for a second time, the forecasters underestimated the acceleration 
of productivity.  Since the March 2001 NBER business cycle peak, labor productivity has 
been stronger than both these upward-revised forecasts and its average following past 
cyclical peaks; the latter is illustrated in Figure 1.  
Productivity’s acceleration has played a major role in monetary policymaking 
during the last decade, and a significant part of the policy debate concerned the quality of 
incoming data.  Accurate, timely data are essential for activist monetary policymaking.  
The FOMC transcripts from 1996 and 1997 suggest that Chairman Greenspan placed 
little confidence in aggregate real GDP as an indicator of the direction of the economy.  
Rather, his focus was on a broad array of individual-industry data.  In particular, he 
focused on productivity growth in manufacturing and the broader nonfinancial corporate 
sector.  One danger in such a disaggregate approach is that many industries primarily 
produce intermediate products that do not appear directly in GDP.5  Policymakers risk 
significant errors if they respond too rapidly to incoming data that later revise 
significantly.6  Increases in labor productivity growth similar to that which occurred in 
the United States during the 1990s has occurred in other eras and other countries, usually 
associated with technological innovations.7  In most instances, analysts (and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
data, have confirmed the shift in trend.  The evidence for potential GDP remains mixed, however; see for 
example Kouparitsas (2005). 
4 See the Sept. 10, 2000, Blue Chip Economic Indicators or the First Quarter 2001 Survey of Professional 
Forecasters. 
5 This point is made clearly by Triplett (2002). 
6 In the models of Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2004), optimal response to imperfect observation of 
output (and productivity) depends on the noise in the system.  The optimal response to the optimal estimate 
of output displays certainty equivalence—but what is to be done when different policymakers have 
different estimates of potential output? 
7 Basu et. al. (2003) compare and contrast the differing US and UK experiences after 1995.        
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policymakers) found it difficult to recognize the occurrence of a “structural break” due to 
lags in the timeliness of incoming data and to subsequent data revisions.8   
2. Productivity in a Simple Model 
A simple neoclassical model illustrates the relationships among the economy’s 
level of real output, Y,  number of workers, L,  real (price-deflated) capital stock, K, and 
the aggregate number of hours worked, H.  We omit current-period time subscripts to 
simplify notation.  Similar to most productivity analyses, we also omit three sectors of 
the economy where output largely is measured by the quantity of inputs and, hence, 
measured labor productivity growth is zero:  all government, including state and local 
educational institutions; households, including housekeeping, home maintenance, child 
rearing, and household consumption of the service flow from owner-occupied housing; 
and nonprofit organizations.  After removing these sectors, what remains is the private 
business sector.9    
Average labor productivity (ALP) is measured as the ratio of the economy’s 












Capital deepening is defined as increases in k, that is, increases in the amount of physical 
capital (buildings, machines and other equipment) available relative to the number of 
                                                           
8 Orphanides (2001), Orphanides and Van Norden (2002, 2003). 
9 Our exposition here follows Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Jorgenson, Ho and Strioh (2002, 2003).        
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hours worked.  Capital deepening increases ALP by providing each worker with more 
capital; in the model, the increased growth of  ln y Δ  is proportional to the share of 
capital.  Note that K is an aggregate of many types of capital, in many industries, and of 
many vintages.  Hence, K is measured by dividing the current-dollar values of a wide 
variety of capital goods (after allowing for depreciation) by their matching price indexes.   
Increases in labor productivity are completely determined by gains in total factor 
productivity (TFP) and capital deepening.   Let the aggregate output of the private 
business sector, Y , consist of consumption goods, C , and investment goods, I .  Assume 
these outputs are produced from two inputs, capital,K , and labor, L, according to a 
relationship  
(1)     (,) (,) YCI A FKL = ∗ , 
where  (,) FKL is an aggregate production function and  A is a time-varying index of the 
amount of output that cannot be accounted for by  measured inputs of labor and capital, 
that is, of TFP.10  Assuming competitive markets and constant returns to scale, the growth 
rates of outputs and inputs are related via the growth accounting equation 
(2)   ln ln ln ln ln ICK L wI wC vK vL A Δ+ Δ = Δ + Δ+ Δ 
where Δ is the first-difference operator defined as  1 ttt X XX − Δ ≡− .11  The weights 
I w and  C w  are the average (over periods t and t-1) value shares of investment and 
consumption goods output in aggregate output ( 1 IC ww + = );  K v and  L v  are the average 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
10 For the aggregate economy, economists tend to interpret the index A as a strictly increasing sequence (as 
a function of time).  But, for an individual industry, many events may cause decreases in A, including 
changes in its regulatory regime and changes in its competitive environment.  
11 Stiroh (2002b) finds that the model’s implications are little changed by relaxing the assumptions of 
perfect competition and that the aggregate production function displays constant returns to scale.        
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value shares, over periods t and t-1, of capital and labor in aggregate national income, 
( 1 KL vv += ); and  ln A Δ  is the growth of TFP.   
Re-arranging equation (2) shows the relationship between the growth rate of 
average labor productivity,  ln y Δ , and its determinants,  
(3)   ln ln ( ln ln ) ln KL yv kv L H A Δ= Δ+ Δ− Δ + Δ. 
To focus on the role of ICT capital,, equation (1) may be re-written as 
(4)   ( , , , ) ( , , , , ) ncsm n c s m YY I I I A XK K K K L =∗  
where  n Y  is non-ICT output;  c I ,  s I , and  m I  are outputs of computer hardware, software 
and communications equipment, respectively; and  c K ,  s K , and  m K  are service flows 
from stocks of computer hardware, software and communications equipment.  In this 
notation, equation (2) may be written as 
(5)  
m I ln ln ln ln




KKKK L ncs m
wY wI wI wI
vK vK vK vK v LA
Δ+ Δ+ Δ+ Δ
=Δ +Δ +Δ +Δ + Δ + Δ
 
where   m I 1 ncs ncsm YII K K K KL wwwwv vvv v +++=++++ = .  Then, equation (3) 
illustrates the relationship of labor productivity growth to ICT capital: 
(6)   ln ln ln ( ln ln ) ln nI T KK L nI T yv k v k v L H A Δ= Δ +Δ + Δ− Δ + Δ 
where  ITc s m K KKK vv v v =++.   
Measurement is a difficult problem when seeking to take this aggregate 
production model to the data.  The three right hand-side terms of equation (3), for 
example, are not independently measured.  Some variables—Y, L, H, K—can be 
measured, at least approximately.  The growth rate of total factor productivity, however,  
is measured as a residual:        
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(4)   ln ln ( ln ln ) ln KL Av kv L H y Δ= Δ+ Δ− Δ − Δ. 
Measurement issues arise for real output, Y, and the real constant-quality capital stock, 
K.  Real output may be mis-measured if the price deflators used to convert nominal 
output into “real” are not accurate.  This may be a particularly difficult problem for the 
services sector, what Griliches (1994) described as a difficult-to-measure sector.  The 
Bureau of Economic Analysis uses component price indexes from the CPI to measure, 
via the deflation method, approximately 57 percent of the output of the business sector.  
Hence, any bias in the CPI’s component price indexes will appear as bias in the measured 
output quantities; see Eldridge (1999).  Similarly, the real quantity of capital, K, is 
difficult to measure accurately because it is a sum of quality-adjusted (constant-quality) 
across many types of capital goods (discussed further below), each of which requires an 
adjustment for quality prior to being deflated for price change.  Biases in measuring the 
quantity of capital inputs, K, will not bias the measured growth rate of average labor 
productivity,  ln y Δ , but will bias the measured growth rate of total factor productivity.   
  In general, data availability makes timely measurement of TFP more difficult and 
less certain than measurement of ALP.  Studies that have sought to separate increases in 
ALP into its components—capital deepening, changes in labor quality, and increases in 
TFP—have often relied on a “price dual” measurement method.12  Intuitively, price 
decreases for ICT goods, relative to other goods, reflect relatively larger increases in TFP 
for ICT goods.  Therefore, the rate of TFP growth is measured by the negative of the rate 
of ICT-goods price decrease, relative to the price change for labor and capital.  While not 
fully satisfactory, alternative procedures are difficult to design for products whose quality        
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and price are changing rapidly, such as semiconductors and computers.  In equation (6),  
errors in measuring the prices of ICT capital affect the growth rate of ICT capital, 
ln IT k Δ , and the growth rate of total factor productivity,  ln A Δ .  To the extent that prices 
of ICT capital are measured with significant uncertainty, then the attribution of labor 
productivity growth to capital deepening versus gains in total factor productivity must be 
highly uncertain.  This distinction is crucially important for projecting forward changes 
in labor productivity because rapid capital deepening—that is, increases in k—tapers off 
as a new steady-state capital-labor ratio, k, is achieved.  As a result, long-run projections 
of labor productivity growth depend critically on projections  
In the balance of this study, we focus on growth rate of ALP, rather than TFP, for 
several reasons.  In the long-run, increases in ALP are the driving force behind economic 
growth and higher living standards (the increased capital stock that contributes to TFP is, 
itself, produced by labor and capital).  The sustainability of ALP is the key issue for 
future growth projections.  Further, TFP is difficult to measure.  Measures of TFP require 
measures of capital stocks, K, which often are subject to more uncertainty than 
measurements of labor inputs and output.  Finally, monetary policy-related discussions 
during the 1990s concerning the growth of potential GDP—the economy’s “speed 
limit—were conducted in terms of accelerating labor productivity growth.   
To understand the channels through which ICT affects productivity, it is useful to 
distinguish between effects due to the production of ICT and due to the use of ICT.   For 
the former, technical progress in semiconductor manufacturing allows more computing 
power to be produced from the same inputs of capital and labor, that is, causes increases 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 Examples include Council of Economic Advisors (2001); Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000); Jorgenson,        
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in TFP (and ALP) for ICT-producing industries.  Since ICT-producing industries also are 
large users of ICT (in both development and production), the lower cost of ICT goods 
induces capital deepening in these industries, again increasing ALP.  For the latter, 
decreases in the cost of ICT induce capital deepening,  lnk Δ .  No increase in TFP occurs 
if the contributions to output are entirely captured by capital deepening.  Increases in 
TFP, if any, arise when the firm reorganizes the way the firm operates.  Examples include 
initiating/expanding e-commerce on the Internet; improving the timeliness of linkages 
between point-of-sale cash registers and inventory management systems; and improving 
network links among geographically separated sites.  Studies suggest that such changes 
in business practice may take considerable time to implement, and hence the response of 
productivity to changes in ICT investment varies among firms and industries.  Such 
variation may delay timely recognition that forces have arisen which, eventually, will 
increase productivity economy-wide. 
We conclude that improvements in ICT goods, and resulting decreases in the 
price of computing power and communications, tend to increase both TFP and ALP.  
Further, both the strength and timing of such effects will tend to differ across industries, 
complicating recognition of increases in aggregate productivity. 
A number of published studies have used models similar to the above to measure  
the contributions of information and communications technology (ICT) to productivity 
growth.  Perhaps the best-known are Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002) and Jorgenson, Ho, 
and Stiroh (2002, 2003).  Although the details differ, both attribute approximately three-
fifths of the acceleration in labor productivity growth during the second half of the 1990s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2001; Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2002); Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002).        
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to capital deepening and, in turn, approximately 80 percent of the capital deepening to 
increases in ICT-related capital.13  Of the residual TFP growth, both studies attribute 
approximately half to ICT-related developments—specifically, increases in the 
productivity of semiconductor manufacturing.   
Overall, both studies conclude that the productivity acceleration of the 1990s can 
be traced, in large part, to rapid decreases in the prices of information-technology 
equipment and components, especially prices of semiconductors. As shown in Figure 6, 
semiconductor prices trended downward throughout the 1990s with the rate of decrease 
accelerating during the latter half of the decade.  Caution must be used in interpreting 
these figures, however, because rapid technical change has introduced thorny quality-
adjustment problems.  In other cases, the survey sample for some products, such as 
semiconductors, has changed.14  Typical is Holdway (2001), p. 15:  
“It would be disingenuous to imply that the PPI has been able to properly value and account for 
technological change in its cmpu [CPU] price measurements. The standard PPI methodologies for 
valuing quality change is [sic] rather limited when faced with quality improvements that are 
accompanied by reduced input costs due to shifts in the production function.”  
 
Holdway also notes that the apparent acceleration of semiconductor price decreases 
during early 1997, as shown in Figure 6, most likely is a result of the introduction of 
secondary source pricing data.15  Similarly, Gullickson and Harper ( 2002) express 
                                                           
13 Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2002, 2003)., following Evsey Domar, measure an industry or sector’s 
“output” as gross value of shipments to households and firms outside its industry or sector. Oliner and 
Sichel measure output as GDP-originating (value added), which excludes from an industry’s shipments the 
value of materials purchased from other sectors.   
14 For semiconductor prices, for example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has a series in the PPI, the Bureau 
of Econonic Analysis has a series used in the national income accounts, and the Federal Reserve Board has 
a price measure used in its industrial production index. See, for example, Hulten (2001). The 
semiconductor price series plotted in figure 6 is the PPI measure relative to the GDP price index. 
15 Secondary source prices are price figures collected from catalogs and industry publications, rather than 
from the manufacturer’s price list. Holdway doesn’t speculate on whether secondary-source price data, if 
available, might change the pre-1997 trend, but the absence of such data introduces a risk into any study 
that attributes the productivity acceleration to more rapid price decreases: Would the studies reach the same 
conclusion if the rate of price decrease from 1993 to 1997 had been the same as that beginning in 1997?         
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caution: 
“These findings rest on estimated trends for high tech inputs and outputs that incorporate 
adjustments to account for changes in their quality.  Many of the high tech input and output 
growth rates are well up in the double-digit percentage range.  These extraordinary trends, in turn, 
rest on the use of quality adjusted price indexes in deflation.  These indicate that prices for high 
tech goods of constant quality have fallen very rapidly.  These price trend estimates have 
withstood much scrutiny, but we must emphasize their importance for our conclusions.  While it is 
likely that real output trends have been underestimated in many or all of the service sector 
industries with negative MFP trends, it is also possible that  the growth trends for high tech imputs 
have been overestimated.  Underestimating service sector output trends would bias the aggregate 
productivity trend downward.  Overestimating high tech input and output trends would bias the 
aggregate productivity trend upward. …  We can express a concern that the “measurement playing 
field” imay not be level.  We have very intrictate means of making quality adjustments to high 
tech goods, but we have few means to make quality adjustments to service outputs.”  
 
Interested readers also should see Grimm (1998), Landefeld and Grimm (2000), and the 
papers in Corrado et al (2005). 
As an example of the interaction between measurement and economic modeling, 
consider the Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002) model.  In this model, the rate of increase in 
total factor productivity is measured by the inverse of the rate of decrease of 
semiconductor prices, creating a direct, mechanical link between observed decreases in 
semiconductor prices and unobserved increases in productivity growth.  The intuition is 
that, because semiconductor prices are falling rapidly relative to the aggregate price 
level, total factor productivity at semiconductor manufacturers must be increasing; if not, 
the firms would exit the industry.  The effect of this clever measurement technique is that 
the sharp decline in semiconductor prices in 1997—seen visually in Figure 2—appears 
immediately as an increase in labor productivity growth.  But, any bias in measuring total 
factor productivity at firms producing semiconductors also appears immediately in their 
productivity growth estimates.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Or, did the decision to solicit secondary source price data reflect observations of increased pricing 
pressure?        
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Updated estimates provided by Dan Sichel suggest that the direct contribution 
from the semiconductor industry directly was responsible for 0.08 percentage points of 
the 0.37 percent growth of TFP from 1974 to 1990 and by 0.13 percentage points of the 
0.58 percent growth of MFP from 1991 to 1995. However, from 1996 to 2003, Oliner’s 
updated estimates show that the direct contribution from the semiconductor industry was 
responsible for 0.40 percentage points of the 1.34 percent growth of MFP.16 But as 
semiconductor prices continue to drop sharply, estimates of structural labor productivity 
growth were revised downward after 2001 as the economy fell into recession.17 This 
suggests that the role of cyclical factors in boosting ALP growth in the 1990s noted 
earlier were also significant.  For their projections for the next decade, Oliner and Sichel 
(2002) forecast average annual labor productivity growth at between a 2.0 and 2.8 
percent rate. They also include ten projections by other authors, also between 2 and 3 
percent per year, with both the mean and mid-point of the forecasts near 2.25 percent 
As seen in Figure 2, the relative change in semiconductor prices has ceased 
declining at the rates that prevailed in the latter part of the 1990s. Although relative 
prices of semiconductors fell by about 38 percent in 2004, this was much less than its 
average decline of about 65 percent from 1998 to 2000. Thus, unless this trend reverses, 
it appears that one can rule out the “optimistic” productivity scenario cited above, and 
that structural labor productivity growth of between 1.33 (pessimistic) and 2.45 percent 
(baseline) appears to be the most likely outcome.  
                                                           
16 Unpublished estimates received from Dan Sichel via e-mail correspondence on June 28, 2004. 
17 In the CEA’s growth accounting table that appears annually in the Economic Report of the President, 
projected long-term labor productivity growth in the nonfarm business sector was lowered from 2.3 
percent in the 2001 Report to 2.1 percent in the 2002 Report.        
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A complementary analysis is presented by Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2003).  
During 1995-2000, ALP growth was 0.8 percent faster, on average, than during 1973-
1995.  The authors estimate that 0.5 percentage points of this increase, roughly two-
thirds, was due to capital deepening as firms responded to decreasing prices of ICT 
equipment by increasing their capital-labor ratios.  As some analysts anticipated, 
purchases of non-ICT capital (whose prices were not falling) decreased slightly, 
subtracting approximately half of one percentage point.  Increased ALP also reflected 
increased TFP in both the ICT-producing and non-ICT producing sectors, contributing 
approximately one-quarter and one-eighth of one percentage point, respectively.  Overall, 
the picture is clearly one of decreasing capital goods prices inducing capital deepening.  
3.  Productivity and Data Revisions: How Much Has the Picture Change Through 
Time? 
Published labor productivity growth rates have two characteristics that complicate 
recognizing changes in trend growth: volatility and revisions.  Volatility is illustrated in 
Figure 3, which shows quarterly compound annual growth rates calculated from currently 
published data for 10-year, 1-year, and 1-quarter intervals.  High volatility is obvious.  
The figure also illustrates that “trend” labor productivity growth since World War II 
displays three phases: more rapid growth from 1948 to 1973; slower growth from 1973 to 
1994; and more rapid growth beginning circa 1995.  Since 1995, the pace of productivity 
growth in the nonfarm business sector has modestly exceeded its rate during the earlier 
high-growth period of 1949 to 1972; for the larger private business sector, however, 
growth over the past 10 years still remains modestly below its earlier pace.  Measured 
labor productivity growth in the nonfarm business sector averaged 3 percent per annum        
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during 1949 to 1972, but less than half this pace during 1973 to 1994, despite strong 
productivity growth in manufacturing.  
Table 1 decomposes productivity growth into growth of its numerator (output) 
and of its denominator (hours).  The increase in productivity growth from 1973-94 
(column 2) to 1995-2004 (column 3) reflects both more rapid growth of the numerator 
(output) and slower growth of the denominator (hours).  For broad sectors, the table 
shows that the post-1973 productivity growth slowdown (compare columns 1 and 2) 
largely was due to slowdowns in the services and nondurable manufacturing sectors—
durable manufacturing’s labor productivity growth increased modestly throughout the 
slowdown period. 18   During the most recent decade, durable manufacturing’s 
productivity growth has jumped to an average annual pace of approximately 5.75 percent, 
double its 1949-72 pace. 
We include separate figures for manufacturing because a number of researchers 
have emphasized that understanding the measurement of, and revisions to, economic data 
requires separating manufacturing from other sectors.  Perhaps the best-known analysis is 
Zvi Griliches’s 1994 presidential address to the American Economic Association 
(Griliches, 1994), in which he separates “well-measured” from less well-measured 
sectors.  He notes, ironically, that the frequency and size of near-term revisions to 
published sectoral data often are inversely related to the data’s quality.  The reason is 
straightforward: Data for well-measured sectors, such as manufacturing, arrives more 
promptly and, hence, results in more near-term revisions.  Data for less well-measured 
sectors, such as service sectors, typically contains a good deal of extrapolation and 
                                                           
18 See for example Bosworth and Triplett (2003a,b), and Kozicki (1997).        
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interpolation; because useful additional data arrives in a less timely fashion, revisions are 
delayed.  This was the case during the 1990s.  Initial published data for the service 
sectors showed no acceleration of productivity growth in services during the 1990s; see, 
for example, Corrado and Slifman (1999).  Currently published data suggest, however, 
that circa 1995 the trend rate of growth of labor productivity in the economy’s services 
sector more than doubled.  Part of the story, as Gullickson and Harper (2002) note, is that 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, in its 1999 comprehensive revision to the national 
income and product accounts (NIPAs), re-classified computer software as a fixed 
investment, and hence as a part of business sector final output (see Table 2).  Previously, 
software had been classified as an intermediate input, and did not explicitly appear in 
value-added calculations.  They note that this methodological change raised measured 
trend productivity growth, particularly in the nonmanufacturing sector.19  In many cases, 
these data revisions have fully reversed previously published conclusions about stagnant 
productivity in the services sectors—compare, for example, Triplett and Bosworth (2003) 
to Triplett and Bosworth (2001) and Stiroh (2002) to Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000). In 
these later revised data, for example, for years since 2000 the contribution of the services 
sectors to economy-wide labor productivity growth exceeds the contribution of 
manufacturing; for years prior to 2000, the contribution of manufacturing exceeds that of 
the services sectors.  
Finally, consider the “high tech” industries.20  As of early 2002, BLS estimated 
                                                           
19 Gullickson and Harper (2002) found that the nonmanufacturing sector’s contribution to the trend growth 
rate of total factor productivity in the private business sector was 0.5 percent per year between 1990 and 
1995 and 0.6 percent per year from 1995 to 1999.  In a 1999 article published before the 1999 NIPA 
revisions, the estimated contribution of the service sector was zero. 
20 There are no official boundaries for the high-tech sector.  Kask and Sieber (2002) discuss the issue in 
terms of 2 and 3 digit SIC industries. The SIC classification system has significant shortcomings for        
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that labor productivity in high-tech manufacturing had increased annually at a 9.5 percent 
rate from 1987-99, and at a 13.1 percent pace during 1995 to 1999; labor productivity for 
all manufacturing, in comparison, increased during the same periods at average annual 
rates of 3.2 percent and 4.4 percent.21  Within the high-tech sector, two industries account 
for nearly three-quarters of the sector’s total: output per hour of labor in the production of 
computers and office equipment grew 27.5 percent per year during 1987-99, and in 
electronic components and accessories the rate was 21.8 percent.  Communications 
equipment exceeded the manufacturing average at 10.4 percent, but four high-tech 
industries experienced labor productivity growth at less than the overall rate for total 
manufacturing. 
Revisions 
Published measures of the economy’s output and labor input are subject to 
revision.  Data revisions complicate the task facing policymakers—measuring the 
strength or weakness of near-term economic conditions—and, in some cases, 
dramatically alter historical measurements of economic activity.22  Each year, for 
example, the Bureau of Economic Analysis revises the national income and product 
accounts, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics revises employment and aggregate hours 
worked in the establishment survey. Whenever there are significant revisions to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
analyzing high-tech industries. Triplett (2002) discusses these limitations, and compares the SIC system to 
the newer NAICS system. 
21 The growth rate of labor productivity equals the growth rate of constant-quality real output (nominal 
output, adjusted for quality change and deflated for price changes) minus the growth rate of labor input 
(measured in hours).  During 1987-99, multifactor productivity in high-tech manufacturing average 5.0 
percent annual growth, versus 1.3 percent for all manufacturing.  Multifactor productivity growth equals 
the growth rate of real output minus an index of the combined growth of all inputs.  During the same 
period, the index of combined inputs grew 2.8 percent per year; see Kask and Sieber (2002).  Note that the 
relevant output concept is nominal output, adjusted for quality change and deflated to constant prices.  
When the performance characteristics of a product are changing rapidly, both quality and price adjustments 
likely are subject to considerable uncertainty.  Hence, measured real output may be less reliable.         
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economic output (the NIPA) or to total labor input (total employment, or hours worked), 
there also are revisions to nonfarm labor productivity; these revisions typically affect 12 
quarters of data and often are substantial in size.  Selected revisions, and their effects, are 
shown in Table 2.23  During this period, annual revisions changed the prevailing 
understanding of productivity growth several times.   
Revisions to national income data change measured productivity, often 
significantly.  Changes since 1994 are summarized in Table 3.24  Overall, revisions to 
productivity growth primarily are due to revisions to measured output and not to 
revisions in measured employment or aggregate hours worked.  Since 1994, for example, 
the mean absolute revision to the growth rate of output, 0.26 percentage points, is one-
third greater than hours worked, 0.19 percentage points, and approximately equal to that 
of the growth rate of productivity growth, 0.32 percentage points. 25   
 “Case studies” of periods during which breaks in trend productivity growth 
occurred provide further insight: 
•    A common feature of changes in trend labor productivity growth is that they are not 
promptly recognized.  A startling demonstration of this phenomenon is shown in 
Figure 4, for 1973.  The figure shows, for each year 1974 to 2004, the then-current 
published growth rate of labor productivity for 1973.  The first-published estimate of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
22 See Himmelberg, et. al. (2004), Kozicki (2004), Orphanides and Van Norden (2003), or Runkle (1998). 
23 These revisions incorporate both the annual multi-year revisions to the NIPAs and the annual 
benchmark revisions to employment and hours from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The revision period is 
nine quarters. See the footnotes to the table. 
24 These revisions incorporate both the annual three-year revisions to the national income and product 
accounts as well as the periodic comprehensive revisions, which occur about every five years. See the 
footnote to the table. 
25 The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ annual benchmark revisions to establishment data have become smaller 
over time. From 1984 to 2004, the absolute percentage change in nonfarm payrolls averaged 0.2 percent, a 
third as much as the 1964-83 period. See Haltom, Mitchell, and Tallman (2005).        
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labor productivity growth was approximately 3 percent.  This value was sharply 
lower in subsequent revisions until, during the late 1980s, the value began to increase.  
In the most-recently published data, 1973’s measured productivity growth is greater 
than its initially published value—removing entirely any “slowdown” during the 
year.26 
•  Vintage productivity data for 1995 and 1996, shown in Figures 5 and 6, also illustrate 
the magnitude of revisions.  For 1995, the currently published value is much lower 
than the initially published value.  Although values published during the first three 
quarters 1995 suggested a productivity acceleration, by mid-1996 the published 
figures for 1995 had been revised downward to less than 1 percent, a deceleration.  
For 1996, the currently published value is much higher than the initially published 
value; see Figure 6.  Figures for 1996 published during 1996 and 1997 were between 
0.5 and 1.5 percent, hardly supportive of acceleration.  Published data for 1995 and 
1996 did not suggest an acceleration of productivity until the third quarter of 1997—
and not until mid-1998 were published data clearly supporting the assertion that 
productivity growth had increased.   
•  In both 1998 and 1999, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported sharply higher growth 
rates of nonfarm labor productivity due to upward revisions in the economy’s 
measured output.  For 1999, the increase largely was due to the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis reporting  that the economy had grown faster than originally measured—
                                                           
26  In this vein, it appears that the switch to chain weights from fixed weights in 1996 (see Table 2) was 
particularly significant.  See Gullickson and Harper (2002). We focus on labor productivity in this analysis.  
Gullickson and Harper (2002) provide a thorough analysis of the BLS total factor (multi-factor) 
productivity measures.        
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helped, in part, by the Bureau’s decision to classify purchased computer software as a 
final output (fixed investment), rather than as an intermediate expense.27  
•  In its 2001 and 2002 annual revisions, the Bureau of Economic Analysis reduced the 
measured growth of the economy in 2001.  The 2001 revision reduced the measured 
three-year growth rate of labor productivity by more than three-quarters of a 
percentage point.   
•  The national income and product accounts revisions published during mid-2005, for 
example, trimmed measured real GDP growth over the previous three years by 0.3 
percentage points per year, to approximately 3.25 percent.     
 
A longer-horizon picture of historical revisions to measured labor productivity growth is 
shown in Figure 7.  For each year, 1959 to 2003, the figure has one vertical line that 
summarizes all the values of that year’s labor growth as published in various issues of the 
Economic Report of the President.  The lower and upper ends of each line correspond to 
the lowest and highest published growth rates, respectively, for that year, while the “dot” 
indicates the most recent estimate.  For many years, the minimum-to-maximum range 
equals or exceeds 2 percentage points.   
Revisions may cause policymakers, through no fault of their own, to find that 
economic conditions at the time of past policy decisions were not as believed at the time.  
Accordingly, economists and policymakers should subjectively place large confidence 
intervals around initial estimates of labor productivity growth.28  But, how large should 
                                                           
27 See Gullickson and Harper (2002). 
28 Initial estimates are published by the BLS in its Productivity and Cost Report.  Revisions to estimated 
output in the nonfarm business sector are primarily due to the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s revisions to        
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they be?  The differences between first-published and most recently published 
productivity figures provides some insight; figures for 1985 to 2005 are summarized in 
Table 4 and Figures 8 and 9.   
Consider, first, Table 4.  The principal conclusion to be drawn from the table is 
that, while mean revisions are small, mean absolute revisions are large, in some cases 
approximately equal to the estimated annual growth rate itself.  For both total private 
business and nonfarm private business sector productivity, the cumulative revisions of 
one-quarter estimates are slightly biased, with a mean of 0.41 and 0.34 percentage points, 
respectively.  The mean absolute revision is larger, roughly 1.8 percentage points.  The 
largest near-term revisions are to manufacturing productivity, output, and hours.  The 
absolute mean of one-quarter durable manufacturing productivity growth is nearly 2.2 
percentage points.  Revisions to four-quarter growth rates are smaller than revisions to 
one-quarter growth rates, although this is due, in part, to the arithmetic of expressing all 
changes—including those for one quarter—as annualized growth rates.  Finally, note that 
revisions to output growth rates are smaller than those for productivity, and that revisions 
to hours worked are smaller than revisions to output—suggesting that hours worked may 
be measured, at least in the near-term, with less error than output.  The appreciably larger 
magnitude of revisions to the manufacturing sector reflects the relatively better 
measurement of the sector, relative to others, not inferior data collection (e.g., Grilliches, 
1994). Among the aggregate business sectors, durable goods manufacturing has the 
largest mean absolute revision—again,  likely due to the better near-term precision with 
which this sector is measured, including more timely incoming revised data.   
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Consider next Figures 8 and 9, which suggest two conclusions.  First, there are 
large differences between first-published and subsequent revised data.  Second, more 
accurate measurement matters: comparing Figures 8 and 9 shows revisions for the 
narrower and somewhat better-measured nonfinancial corporate business sector are 
smaller than for the broader and less well-measured nonfarm private business sector.  
Below, we note that the FOMC transcripts show Chairman Greenspan pressing the same 
point well before revised data were available: measured productivity in the nonfinancial 
corporate sector was a superior indicator of the economy’s trend productivity growth, 
when compared to other sectors. 
Finally, as anticipated, we note that mean revisions to four-quarter measures of 
productivity, output and hours generally are less then two-thirds the size of revisions to 
one-quarter growth.  An exception is mean revisions to growth of manufacturing 
productivity, output, and hours—a highly well-measured sector—that are larger at the 
four-quarter horizon then at the one-quarter horizon, although the absolute mean of the 
revisions is not. 
4. Productivity and Policymaking:  How Much Did Forecasts Change Through Time? 
Productivity “surprises” can arise both when near-term productivity growth 
differs from that which was anticipated, and when measured past growth is revised.  Both 
types of surprises are important for policymakers. 
Figure 8 displays projections, from the FOMC’s “Greenbook,” of annual labor 
productivity growth for 1997-2000 as reported in various issues from September 1996 to 
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December 1999.29  Apparent are the marked changes through time in the forecast of each 
year’s productivity growth.  Further, the upward trend in each year’s forecast suggests 
that the staff persistently under-estimated the strength of labor productivity over this 
period. Indeed, the pattern of upward revisions in Figure 8 is very similar to those seen in 
Figure 6.  FOMC transcripts, discussed further below, show that Chairman Greenspan, 
and others, were frustrated by the slow pace at which the Board staff revised upward their 
productivity forecasts.  
Following the more rapid labor productivity growth that began in 1995, many 
forecasters—public and private—increased their estimates of the structural (or long-term) 
growth of labor productivity and potential GDP.  Typical are Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) projections, shown in Table 5.  In 1997, the CBO projected that labor 
productivity and potential real GDP would grow during the next decade at 1.1 percent 
and 2.1 percent rates, respectively.  Later, in 2001, the CBO projected growth rates of 2.7 
percent and 3.3 percent.  More recently, the CBO has trimmed both projections by a bit 
more than one-fourth of a percentage point.   
During the latter 1990s, private sector analysts tended to be as reluctant as the 
FOMC’s staff to revise upward projected trend productivity growth; hence, their 
revisions are similar to the Greenbook.  Later, as the data revised, their forecasts moved 
rapidly.  In January 1997, a survey of forecasters by Blue Chip Economic Indicators 
pegged potential GDP growth at 2.5 percent, implying long-term annual productivity 
growth near 1.4 percent.  By September 2000, this estimate had increased to 3.8 percent, 
                                                           
29 Prior to each meeting, the Federal Reserve Board staff prepares a suite of briefing material for the 
FOMC.  One of these documents is referred to as the “Greenbook” due to its grass-green cover.  
Greenbook contents are available to the public after five years and redaction of certain confidential 
material.         
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implying a structural labor productivity growth rate of approximately 2.7 percent.  In 
retrospect, it is likely that the faster pace was overly optimistic, perhaps unduly 
influenced by the latter 1990’s rapid growth.  During 2001, as economic activity slowed 
and the economy slid into recession, estimates of “long-term” structural productivity 
growth also were reduced.  But, productivity growth remains difficult to forecast.  Labor 
productivity in the non-farm private business sector increased 5.4 percent between the 
first quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004.  This was both the largest increase 
since 1965 and substantially faster than projected.   
 
5.  Monetary Policymaking and the New Economy 
At the January 2004 meeting of the American Economic Association, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan characterized monetary policy as a matter of risk 
management, an application of Bayesian decisionmaking.  With respect to the early 
1990s resurgence of productivity growth, he said: 
“The rise in structural productivity growth was not obvious in the official data on gross product 
per hour worked until later in the decade, but precursors had emerged earlier.  The pickup in new 
bookings and order backlogs for high-tech capital goods in 1993 seemed incongruous given the 
sluggish economic environment at the time.  Plant managers apparently were reacting to what they 
perceived to be elevated prospective rates of return on the newer technologies, a judgment that 
was confirmed as orders and profits continued to increase through 1994 and 1995.  Moreover, 
even though hourly labor compensation and profit margins were rising, prices were being 
contained, implying increasing growth in output per hour.” 
 
“As a consequence of the improving trend in structural productivity growth that was apparent 
from 1995 forward, we at the Fed were able to be much more accommodative to the rise in 
economic growth than our past experiences would have deemed prudent.  We were motivated, in 
part, by the view that the evident structural economic changes rendered suspect, at best, the 
prevailing notion in the early 1990s of an elevated and reasonably stable NAIRU.  Those views 
were reinforced as inflation continued to fall in the context of a declining unemployment rate that 
by 2000 had dipped below 4 percent in the United States for the first time in three decades.” 
 
While many pundits had long recognized that digital computers were changing the 
economy, the effects had been gradual and heterogenous among firms and industries.          
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  For monetary policymakers during the 1990s, as it had been since 1982, the 
question was setting an appropriate target level for the federal funds rate.30  Discussion in 
the Committee’s meetings often concerned both the “GDP gap” and the “sustainable” 
growth rate of real GDP (even before the term “potential” came into common use).  
Taylor (1993) later adroitly summarized the Committee’s reaction function.  The growth 
rate of labor productivity entered the discussion as one component of the growth rate of 
potential real GDP.   
The issues confronting the FOMC during the 1990s were not new—the same 
issues had arisen during the 1980s “high-tech” boom.  What was uncertain were the size 
and persistence of the effects.  The potential for ICT capital to increase productivity in 
specific firms and industries was well-known; Wynne (2002) notes that a computer was 
Time magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 1982.  And, judged by growth rates, there had 
been previous “high-tech” capital booms: Gross private investment in information 
processing equipment and software soared during the mid-1960s, late 1970s and, more 
briefly, during the early 1980s.  Surrounding each episode were both the optimists, 
arguing that computers would change the world, and the pessimist, skeptical that 
computers would increase productivity and real output.   
   It is useful to re-visit the 1980s FOMC meetings to place the 1990s debate in 
perspective.31  Productivity growth was a major topic at the May 1983 FOMC meeting.  
                                                           
30 Wynne (2002) discusses in detail the time-line of federal funds rate targets during the 1990s in response 
to incoming productivity data.  Thronton (2005) more generally discusses the FOMC’s federal funds rate 
target beginning September 1982. 
31 This section is based on FOMC transcripts publicly available on the Board of Governors web site.  To 
locate all references to “productivity,” the transcripts were both visually scanned (that is, read) and 
searched in Adobe Acrobat.  Transcripts for some earlier years on the Board’s web site are PDF image-
only files,  not text searchable.  We thank Dan Thornton for making available his OCR versions of these 
transcripts.        
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The Board staff was forecasting near-term annual labor productivity growth at a 3-1/2 
percent rate, based largely on a cyclical rebound.  The staff noted that they had revised 
upward their trend growth rate for labor productivity to a one percent pace, from a 
previous ¾ of 1 percent.  For 1984, they predicted near-trend increases of 1-1/4 to 1-1/2 
percent.  Members, including Chairman Volcker, labeled the forecast “pessimistic.”  At 
the July meeting, the staff was “just a little over 1 percent,” “in the 1-1/4 percent range.”  
At the December meeting, an exchange between President Morris and Board staff 
economist Joyce Zickler highlighted the problem of discerning trend from cycle in 
incoming productivity data: 
MR. MORRIS. I have an intuitive feeling that your 1 percent productivity assumption is too 
pessimistic just because I see so many structural changes that were made in the last three years in 
terms of reducing staff overhead and in terms of changes in work rules. When we went through 
the 1970s with a lower rate of productivity growth than we could explain on the basis of the 
ordinary analytical factors, we got a big negative residual. It seems to me that maybe we will start 
to see some bounce back: maybe we’ll start getting a positive residual. What was the basis for 
your 1 percent productivity assumption, which I think is 1 percentage point too low?  
 
MS. ZICKLER. At this point in the business cycle we’re seeing increases that are largely cyclical 
in nature. We try as best we can to look through these increases and see what underlying trend 
that type of behavior would be consistent with. And that’s basically how we came up with it. 
Now, you’re right, that during the last recession we saw a lot of shedding of labor, a lot of 
changes that kept productivity growing—even last year during a period when normally it would 
decline. So, to some extent, these developments that you talk about could be once-and-for-all 
changes in the productivity level that wouldn’t become embodied in a continued improvement in 
the growth rate. But to the extent that business is making an attempt to invest in new technology 
and really change on an ongoing basis some of those undefined things--things that we couldn’t 
define during the ’70s very well—then, yes, we could be too pessimistic. I think the coming year 
will be the critical year for evaluating where we are on this productivity path because generally 
what shows up in the second year of recovery is a sharp deceleration toward a trend rate of 
growth. If we keep getting information that tells us that the productivity is doing better than 1 
percent, that will firm up the view that perhaps the trend is changing and could be closer to 2 
percent or whatever. 
 
Throughout the year, members remained skeptical that trend productivity was not 
increasing.  This exchange between President Roberts and Ms. Zickler at the November 
1983 meeting highlights the issues: 
 
MR. ROBERTS. … On the productivity [issue]. I guess you took into account this major change 
from manufacturing to services in the 1970s as one of the factors holding back productivity. With 
services now such a large part of the economy, would that from here on out tend to cause the same 
or an increased rate of productivity if it stabilized, let’s say?        
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MS. ZICKLER. The bulk of the research that was done, as we discussed earlier, was unable to pin 
that down for the 1970s. Most of the research showed that productivity slowed in service 
industries as well as in manufacturing industries. The pattern of the slowdown was at least the 
same across different types of industries, so we were unable to pin this productivity slowdown on 
the growing services sector. Looking ahead and having the services sector be one of the growing 
sectors, I’m not sure that that should detract from the things that seem to be important in the 
productivity slowdown. however undefined they may be. There are some technological changes 
that could affect the services sector as well as manufacturing. 
 
MR. ROBERTS. That really is the point that I was coming to.  I think maybe some of the drag in 
productivity in the services sector is now being overcome. Productivity is coming to the services 
sector. And if you have lower [productivity in the] manufacturing sector also as [the staff] has 
here--I’m just saying that I think productivity estimates are too low for the short run anyway.  
 
At this meeting, somewhat more than earlier meetings, FOMC members discussed the 
linkage between productivity growth and inflation.  Indeed, most members seemed 
concerned with productivity growth via a markup pricing model in which markups were 
extremely sticky such that more rapid productivity growth both tempered inflation and 
boosted profits.   
At the May 1984 meeting, President Morris and Chairman Volcker noted that the 
capital- goods boom underway was substantially “…all electronics,” and hence augured 
well for productivity gains.  At the July meeting, the staff continued to predict a trend 
productivity growth rate of 1-1/4 percent.  President Morris, however, cited anecdotal 
evidence that firms were expecting “extraordinarily high productivity” from new 
capital—and had better be, given the high cost of capital funding.  James Kichline, 
director of the Board’s division of research and statistics, explained that the staff’s 
projected 1-1/4 percent trend for the 1980s was a significant increase relative to the 
staff’s estimated trend of 0.6 percent annual growth during the 1970s.  
Throughout 1984, members continued to relate anecdotes regarding firms’ 
productivity gains in their districts.  Although most of the gains were in manufacturing, 
some members cited gains in services.  Such anecdotes fueled the belief that mis-       
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measurement plagued the services sector.  At the September 1986 meeting, Governor 
Angell pressed the issue:  
“Productivity in the service sector is low but I don’t think we know how to measure it. 
Productivity in the goods producing sector remains right at the 3.2 percent level that it has been at 
for some time.”   
 
Members continued to press the issue at subsequent meetings, as illustrated by the 
following exchange at the November 1986 meeting.  Chairman Volcker’s impatience 
with official productivity statistics is apparent: 
 
MR. PRELL [Mike Prell, deputy director of the Board’s division of research and statistics]. It 
seems like whenever I’m up here giving a briefing the same question arises about the productivity 
figures. I think many of these collective bargaining agreements involve the manufacturing sector 
where the data would indicate that we have been getting fairly substantial increases in 
productivity--maybe not as much as the anecdotal evidence for individual companies would 
suggestbut, on the whole, quite good gains. For this cycle the gains are much more favorable in 
comparison to past cyclical experience than for the rest of the economy. 
 
CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. More favorable than past cyclical experience? 
 
MR. PRELL. Well, I guess at least as favorable as— 
 
MR. ANGELL. Yes. 
 
MR. PRELL. --previous cycles in contrast to the overall picture. But, as you know, the total for 
the nonfarm business sector has been less favorable and the data, such as they are, show that in a 
number of the more service-oriented sectors we just aren’t seeingproductivity improvement. 
 
MR. ANGELL. Of course, what this means--and I’ve had several conversations with our staff 
over this--is that, with productivity in manufacturing doing what it is and the way we go about 
measuring it, we have to have negative productivity in the service sector. And that raises the 
question as to how we measure productivity in the service sector; the fact of the matter is that we 
really don’t. So there is some kind of strange averaging process going on there. I think there’s 
really grave doubt as to what our productivity in the service sector is. But if productivity in the 
service sector is stronger than we’re measuring then that means, of course, that our economy is 
doing a little better than we are measuring. So there are those two aspects that are very interesting. 
 
CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. You don’t think more computers mean less productivity? 
 
MR. ANGELL. No. 
 
At the December 1986 meeting, Governor Angell again raised the argument that 
aggregate productivity data are mis-measured: 
MR. ANGELL. Jim [James Kichline, director of the Board’s division of research and statistics], 
how much different does productivity look if you differentiate between the service sector and the 
goods producing sector? 
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MR. KICHLINE. Well, we don’t really have good data, as you know, for well over a year. The 
evidence that we have suggests that manufacturing productivity is probably rising 3-1/2 to 4 
percent. Service sector productivity is just really quite poor. So, we are getting strong productivity 
gains: that is important in this forecast. In terms of potential growth, we are trying to look at trend 
productivity for the economy in total, but there is a great deal of variation among sectors. 
 
MR. ANGELL. Then it is possible that we really don’t measure productivity in the service sector 
and don’t measure the value of output in the service sector. We just assume productivity is going 
to be zero in the service sector, and lo and behold it is. 
 
MR. KICHLINE. No, I think there is a little more information than that. Let’s say it is open to 
question but there is a little more information than an assumption of zero. 
 
Resisting member anecdotes, at the November 1989 meeting Mike Prell re-affirmed that 
the staff’s projected trend rate of labor productivity growth is 1-1/4 percent. 
As economic activity slowed during 1989 and 1990, productivity tended to be less 
discussed at FOMC meetings—perhaps because disagreements over projections of the 
trend growth rate of potential output seemed less important during a recession.  In August 
1992, as the economy strengthened, a discussion trend productivity arose:  
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. President Stern. 
 
MR. STERN. Dave [Stockton, deputy director of the Board’s division of research and statistics], 
while we're on this: What is your estimate of potential growth in the economy these days and how 
do you parcel that out? 
 
MR. STOCKTON. At this point our estimate of potential would be 2 percent with roughly 1 
percent in trend productivity and a 1 percent increase in labor input. That's a tad lower than where 
we were before we saw all the [unintelligible] revisions, which revised output growth down. So, 
we're just a little below. 
 
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Is there a tendency that that 1 percent might be higher? 
 
MR. STOCKTON. On trend productivity? Yes, that's certainly a possibility, although currently 
when we're coming out of the business cycle trough— 
 
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. We are? [Laughter] 
 
MR. STOCKTON. --it's difficult to pin down what the trend in fact is. The good productivity 
performance that we've seen thus far in the recovery is not inconsistent with normal cyclical 
behavior if one were to assume a trend of 1 percent. That is in some sense how we infer what the 
trend is. But one could certainly say that at this stage we don't know how much of this 
restructuring is actually accomplishing some underlying improvement in trend productivity and 
how much of it is just simply using the existing work force more effectively as firms always don 
in a cyclical recovery. So, there's certainly a possibility that it could be better, but I wouldn't bet 
on it at this point. If one thinks back to where we were in the early '80s, coming out of that 
recession there was a tendency, I think, for many people to overestimate the improvement in 
productivity. There was talk then that the trend had improved to maybe 2 percent or in excess of 2        
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percent and it turned out to be a disappointment that as we progressed through the decade we 
didn't see that kind of improvement. So, I think it's always difficult when you see the good 
increases in productivity early on [in a recovery] to know exactly how much is trend and how 
much is cyclical. 
 
 
Finally, at the December 22, 1992 meeting, Chairman Greenspan offered a lengthly 
discourse on a possible shift in trend productivity growth.  It is included here in its 
entirety because of its value in setting the stage for policy discussions throughout the 
1990s: 
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN:  One of the more interesting aspects of what is going on at the  
moment--it's something that a number have alluded to--is that we basically have a productivity-
driven recovery, or more exactly arithmetically the gross domestic product increase is largely 
attributable to the rise in productivity and to a marginal extent to the rise in average hours worked. 
The outlook for that particular variable is really quite critical to a number of the issues that have 
been raised around this table. There is an interesting question as to whether, in fact, we can have 
continued strong growth without employment growth. Obviously, theoretically we can. The 
question really gets to the issue of whether or not this productivity surge we've been looking at is 
abnormal or not. It is quite unprecedented in the context of how little economic growth we have 
had since March 1991. 
 
There are essentially two hypotheses about what those increases are attributable to, both of which 
could turn out to be right. The first is that the level of output per work hour at the bottom of the 
recession was quite low relative to the inputs of both physical capital and human capital. In a 
sense that's saying that the economy was not operating at an efficient level relative to its inputs. In 
that case, by just tightening up one can very readily reduce labor input and create within a certain 
range a rise in output per work hour. One presumes that that can continue to increase until we run 
up to the upper edge of that range, meaning that the existing capital, both physical and human, is 
being employed at its most efficient levels. 
 
The second possibility here is that the norm of long-term productivity growth … has tilted 
upward. In that case. we're not looking at 1 percent or slightly more than 1 percent [as the norm], 
but conceivably all of a sudden something has occurred which has changed the longer-term 
productivity growth [trend]. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that there is at least something to 
that. Jerry [Corriganl, I don't know if you remember that breakfast where we had a very 
interesting representation of manufacturing corporations who were raising the point that this 
restructuring that is going on had only really begun, which is the same issue that you were getting 
from the New York [business leaders]. It strikes me that what may be happening--and say "may"--
is that we have looked for years and years for the significant impact of productivity growth 
coming off the major computer input in telecommunications and high-tech capital assets and, as 
you may recall, we got very little of it. I think the reascm is that we did not have the software. 
Essentially we could not really employ that degree of computational power without a major 
upswing in the analytic capabilities in using the equipment. In the last five or six years, or maybe 
a little longer, there has been a very dramatic increase in applicable software. One need only look 
at the stock market price of Microsoft to see the market valuation of this particular asset coming 
on stream. The people Jerry and I were talking to at the breakfast were talking about 
[unintelligible] systems manufacturing. I remember one of the people there was an old friend of 
mine from a company called which used to put DC motors into the rolling mills of a lot of the 
steel operations: that was their market. So, I raised the question: Is the big steel business now        
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basically heavily DC motors? And he said "We don't even think that way anymore. What we think 
of is complete computer operating systems of manufacturing." If you go around and speak to 
people. what you find is that in the last two or three years there has been a major change in the 
way manufactured goods are created. And if you look~at the data in the nonmanufacturing area, 
we are finally beginning to see some definite quickening in output per work hour in that area as 
well. 
 
So, what we may well be looking at, and what the restructuring is essentially all about, is the 
stripping out of big segments of employment. Companies are literally taking divisions and just 
wiping them out. A lot of that is directly applicable to the information systems that are created by 
the telecommunications-computer matrix. That is. a very large part of overhead has been 
communications overhead, meaning in the extreme form [a situation] where everyone just writes 
memoranda to each other. But the communications managerial systems have improved very 
dramatically to the point where people have been washed out of the system at a very rapid rate. 
 
If this is the beginning of something of quite important significance, the question is whether it is 
in fact saying that our potential GDP is being underestimated. Something may be going on here. 
The trouble is that we will not be able to know that for a while. It is quite conceivable that part of 
the problem that we're looking at is that the marginal cost of adding new people is so great at this 
stage that it may be creating somewhat of an illusion about the relationship between capital and 
labor: it may be creating an attitude on the part of a number of managers that they just will not 
hire new people except under duress because the obvious medical costs, employment training, and 
all the other costs are very large. And the big upswing in the temporary employment rolls is really 
quite impressive and clearly out of line with what the previous history of temporary employment 
has been.  
 
So, we may have a technical problem here which is obscuring what is going on and may be 
making it appear to be a much bigger issue than it is. But what is certainly the case. if the 
Greenbook GDP figures are right or if those figures are any stronger than that, is that we are going 
to get one of two scenarios. One is that we will get a very marked increase in actual employment 
growth, because it's difficult to imagine the average workweek going very much higher than it is. 
And if we are at the upper ranges of productivity growth, then the arithmetic of the system 
basically says that it all falls out to increased employment. The alternate scenario is that we are 
badly missing a major secular change in the productivity trend, in which case this is going to work 
out somewhat differently. It's not clear to me how it will play out in the sense that we do know 
that without a significant increase in employment, we will run into problems with how to get 
consumption continuing to [increase]. especially when the saving rate is as low as it is. And this is 
a low saving rate despite the fact that we still have significant debt repayment going on. The debt 
pressures are clearly still there. 
 
I suspect the outlook, therefore, is a bit uncertain because of secular changes that are occurring, 
and I'm a little hesitant at this point to argue that we have a clear view as to how it will come ol.lt. 
I'm not saying, incidentally, that there are negative elements in this. There is, however. as pointed 
out by a number of you and in the excellent memo that the International Division put out, a very 
clear indication that the rest of the world is in really sad shape. We don't need the published data 
from foreign statistical agencies to tell us what,.is going on. As a number of you have mentioned, 
in terms of the general view of the multinational corporations, sometime a couple of months ago 
the order series for the foreign affiliates of U.S. corporate manufacturers all of a sudden just went 
"bang." There was a hole and Germany apparently just fell off the cliff. That's true in a lot of 
discussions. I was a little surprised at the Canadian [situation]. but presumably that's not all that 
much different. But there is a potentially fairly significant drag coming from the international side, 
which affects this [outlook] as well. 
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The discussion continued at the February 2-3, 1993 meeting.  Noting 1992’s 3 
percent increase in labor productivity, members questioned why the forecast expected a 
rapid decrease to a 1.3 percent pace.  In response, Board staff noted that the 1.3 percent 
pace in fact was an increase from their previous projection of a 1 percent trend growth 
rate.  Little was said regarding productivity at the March meeting except the Chairman’s 
comment that “Productivity is picking up in a fairly substantial way, and I suspect it is 
basically real.”  Productivity was little discussed during subsequent meetings until 
Governor Angell’s frustration at the August 1993 meeting: 
Productivity has been a real puzzle for me. Clearly, if your forecast gets really thrown awry you 
say it's a puzzle; and part of my real economic forecast for [1993] has certainly missed the mark. I 
Really just don't understand productivity. I don't understand how we can have a decline in 
productivity for the business sector of 1-1/2 and 2-1/2 percent two quarters in a row when 
productivity in manufacturing has been rising at 4-1/2 to 5 percent! Somebody is doing very, very 
poorly; and if anyone knows who it is—who really snuffing on the job--they haven't been spotted 
yet. So, that is indeed a real puzzle.  
 
At the following meeting in September, Governor Angell noted that the recent revisions 
to the national income accounts had worsened the productivity-trend puzzle: 
“To make it even worse, the revisions seem to show productivity trends, higher than we thought 
they were. We've got productivity trends very, very high…” 
 
Chairman Greespan also made clear his suspicion of the incoming data: 
 
I think the policy questions are less difficult, less a matter of concern. The more I look at the data 
the more I'm inclined to believe, as some of you have hinted, that there is something wrong with 
the numbers we are looking at. It's just not credible to me that we can have a significant rise in 
employment and in hours both from the payroll series and the household series--two measures that 
are about as independent as one can get of an economic phenomenon—and say that the GDP 
indicates productivity declined in the first half of this year. Now, I don't know what is going on in 
the statistical system, but I'm almost certain that out in the real world in an economy that is 
growing, the thought that we are having declining productivity just doesn't square with my 
understanding of the real world.  
 
Historically we have had alternate measures of output—for example, gross domestic income. Granted, 
the income side of the national income accounts is a little more flaky measure--with the proprietor 
incomes categories and even some of the profitability numbers--than the output side, which is the 
reason obviously that the output side is used. But if you look at it, you get something that frankly 
looks a lot more credible. You get a much lower rate of increase in gross real incomes in the second 
half of last year, or more exactly in the growth of gross domestic income in constant dollars; that grew 
a lot more slowly than the GDP and it was moderately faster in the first half of this year. I haven't 
looked to see what happened to the productivity numbers but my suspicion is they were still going        
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down a little. I'm inclined to believe that when we look back at this period with the better annualized 
data, which may be a year or two years from now, it's going to look better because we can't have the 
unemployment rate declining, the initial claims falling and, as Governor Mullins said, a tight labor 
market with average hours of work moving up, and have declining productivity. It just doesn't make 
sense.  Something is wrong with the data system, and I suspect—or I hope—that eventually that will 
get resolved. If you look at the industrial production index and its counterparts in other elements of 
GDP, it does look as though it was extraordinary even before the revisions; but with the revision we're 
still getting some evidence that the real part--the goods part--of the GDP may be running somewhat 
under what we're picking up in the industrial production index. It's a close issue and, frankly, I haven't 
had a chance to have somebody look at it in the detail that I would look at it. But the numbers just 
don't square. If that is in fact the case, we may be not all that far from potential here. I'd say the 
economy is moving [up at a rate] that has to be over 2 percent at this point, maybe 2-1/2 percent. I 
realize that this may seem to be making the figure look the way I think policy ought to run, but since I 
don't sense that anybody out there is talking in terms of any radical changes, I won't press this issue. 
 
At the December 19, 1995 FOMC meeting, Chairman Greenspan offered “a broad 
hypothesis about where the economy is going over the longer term and what the 
underlying forces are.”  He argued that anecdotal evidence from industry-level sources 
suggested that purchases of equipment and software were changing businesses in 
fundamental ways.  He noted the shortcomings of the productivity statistics 
“One would certainly assume that we would see this in the productivity data, but it is difficult to 
find it there. In my judgment there are several reasons, the most important of which is that the data 
are lousy.”  
 
and emphasized that major technological innovations usually take a long time to have 
their full impact on productivity as businesses reorganize to take full advantage of the 
opportunities afforded by the new technology.  For monetary policy, he noted: 
  “It is unclear exactly how [the restructuring of business to make better use of computer 
technology] fits into our policy process. But I think it is important to put this point on the table, 
and I present it as a hypothesis since it is something that we will not be sure is the appropriate 
assessment of our changing world for probably five to ten years.” 
 
For the Chairman, rapid increases in business profits were signaling gains in productivity 
beyond the gains evident in published data.32  As Meyer (2004) notes, Chairman 
                                                           
32 The indicator value of increasing profits as a signal of increased productivity has a long history; see, for 
example, comments by Edward Boehne during the February 1983 FOMC meeting.  The Board staff’s 
productivity trend rate, as of February 1983, was approximately 1 percent, vs. 2-1/2 percent earlier in the 
post-war period.  The Board staff was forecasting actual productivity growth of 2-1/2 percent in 1983 and 
1-1/2 percent in 1984, driven by manufacturing with “not as much going on” in the services sector.  In the        
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Greenspan’s view of the nascent acceleration in productivity growth was formed largely 
by both his numerous contacts in the business sector and his abiding belief that the 
published aggregate data were not correctly measuring the effects of information 
technological innovations that businesses were claiming to have garnered.   
With few exceptions, Greenspan views were discounted by both the Board’s staff 
and his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).  But the Chairman 
was not dissuaded.  He noted, for example, that available data suggested that the service 
sector had achieved no productivity gain in twenty years, an unlikely event.  If this 
measurement was wrong, how many more were incorrect?  As the discrepancies 
widened, in 1996 he requested that the Board’s economic research staff conduct a project 
to assess the accuracy of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ published productivity figures.33  
Although that study confirmed the picture painted by the then-current data, subsequent 
data revisions changed the picture.  Later published aggregate data converged to the more 
rapid growth suggested by the Chairman’s anecdotal, firm-level data. 
An interesting question is whether “anecdotal evidence” is an adequate basis for 
formulating national monetary policy.  Yet, there was significant evidence supporting the 
Chairman’s views; a number of published studies had explored the growing importance 
of IT in business.  For example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt’s (1996) paper had been written in 
1993 and presented at a number of workshops, including the Federal Reserve.  In their 
article, they argue that previous studies which had concluded that computers added 
nothing to total output were flawed because those authors sought to measure the impact 
                                                                                                                                                                             
FOMC transcripts, Board research director Kichline notes that “.. some interesting things happened in 
1982. One is that productivity started rising very early. “ 
33 See Woodward (2000) for a detailed discussion of this episode and the mechanics of the 1996 internal 
study, which was subsequently published by Corrado and Slifman (1999).        
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of computers by searching for excess stock returns in firms with high IT-related 
investment.  In equilibrium, however, efficient markets theory argues that firms wich 
spend more on IT capital should not have higher rates of return on equity than other 
firms.  Rather than compare stocks prices and earnings, they fit an economic production-
theory, input-demand model to data collected during five annual surveys, 1987–1991, of 
several hundred large firms.  They conclude that the “…gross marginal product for 
computer capital averaged 81% for the firms in our sample.”  Subtracting typical annual 
depreciation of approximately 30 percent, net annual yields to IT investment, averaged 
over the five years, were near 50 percent.  Dewan and Min (1997) analyzed the same data 
for 1988-1992 using a more flexible input demand model.  They noted that IT capital, for 
their sample firms, was 2% of total capital outlays in 1982 but nearly 16% by 1994, 
motivated by a 20% average annual rate of decline in the quality-adjusted price of IT 
capital from 1960–1992.  Their estimated the gross marginal return for their median firm 
was similar to Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996). 
  The above studies of IT capital in large firms were approximately 
contemporaneous with FOMC deliberations during the early 1990s (especially 
considering the lag between authorship and publication).  While speculative, it seems 
reasonable that at least some FOMC members had heard similar messages.  
Later studies of IT strategies at large firms during 1987–1996 reached similar 
conclusions. Ramirez and Melville (1998) examined a panel of 517 publicly traded 
firms.34  The firms’ IT capital stock as a share of tangible assets increased from 
                                                           
34 Ramirez and Melville (1998) examine large U.S. firms drawn from the Fortune 1,000 list.  While 1694 
firms are observed for at least one year, only 517 firms are observed in all 10 years.  Average revenue, 
profit and number of employees of these firms aligns well with figures for both the Fortune 500 and 1,000 
firms.  Seventy variables are available for each firm in each year.        
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approximately 2 percent in 1987 to 8 percent in 1996, and the annual growth rate of IT 
capital as a share of total tangible capital accelerated to a 46 percent pace during 1992–
1994, from 13 percent during 1987–1992.  Among these firms, the  increase in the 
average per-firm IT capital stock differed little between manufacturing-sector and 
service-sector firms—both increased from approximately $20 million in 1987 to $120 
million in 1994.   
Disaggregating further, however, they found that the service-sector firms had 
larger IT capital stocks than the manufacturing-sector firms, approximately $160 million 
per firm in the “transportation, communications, utilities” sector, for example, versus $80 
million in the manufacturing-sector firms.  Measured relative to corporate revenues 
(gross output), service-sector firms other than retail and wholesale trade also were more 
IT-intensive than manufacturing.  Finally, measured per employee, services-sector firms 
were almost twice as IT-capital intensive as manufacturing firms (see second Figure 
below).  Gurbaxani, Melville and Kraemer (1998) find that a higher degree of networking 
within the firm, closely related to the use of PCs, has strong positive returns.   Recently, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) revisited the 1987–1994 data to measure the time-profile of 
returns to IT capital investment.  They conclude that first-year returns are small rates, and 
that returns increase sharply with the length of the measured time interval.  Their results 
reinforce other studies which have found that the greatest rewards from IT investment 
accrue to firms which re-organize their business practices, a time-consuming process.  In 
a recent review, Melville, Kraemer and Gurbaxani (2004) find even today’s business 
strategy “best practices” inadequate for maximizing organization performance from 
information technology.         
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Skepticism regarding a productivity acceleration due to IT investment was 
apparent in the Boards’ February 1997 Humphrey-Hawkins Monetary Policy Report:  
 “Growth of output per hour in the nonfarm business sector as a whole picked up in 1996, rising 
about 1¼ percent over the year according to preliminary data. However, coming after a three-year 
period in which output per hour changed little, this rise left the average rate of productivity 
growth in the 1990s a bit below that of the 1980s and well below the average gains achieved in 
the first three decades after World War II. The sustained sluggishness in measured productivity 
growth this decade is difficult to explain, as it has occurred during a period when high levels of 
investment in new capital and extensive restructuring of business operations should have been 
boosting the efficiency of workers. Of course, measurement problems could be distorting the 
data…A considerable amount of recent research suggests that growth of output and productivity is 
in fact understated, but whether the degree of understatement has been increasing over time is less 
clear.” 
 
The Monetary Policy Report is a public document, careful and moderate in tone.  At the 
February 4, 1997, FOMC meeting, the Chairman had been somewhat more blunt in 
response to suggestions that productivity growth had not picked up as much as he 
asserted: 
 
“So, the productivity gains implicit in these data [anecdotal reports] are larger than the ones we 
are getting in the official data. The one thing we know about the official data on productivity is 
that they are wrong.” 
 
Wynne (2002) tracks the gradual acceptance of increased productivity growth through 
FOMC documents during the 1990s.  Commenting on the outlook for inflation at the 
Minutes of the September 1996 FOMC meeting note that members 
 
“…observed that the recent behavior of price inflation was a welcome though highly unusual 
development, given current pressures on resources. The statistical and anecdotal information 
provided evidence of increasingly tight labor markets that under similar conditions historically 
had been associated with considerable upward pressure on nominal labor compensation and, in 




“Standard statistical measures that pointed to relatively limited increases in productivity seemed 
inconsistent with strong profits as well as with anecdotal reports of sizable gains associated with 
widespread business restructuring activities and large additions of high-technology equipment to 
an increasingly efficient capital stock.” 
 
In the July 1997 Monetary Policy Report testimony, Chairman Greenspan noted: 
 
“We do not now know, nor do I suspect can anyone know, whether current developments are part 
of a once or twice in a century phenomenon that will carry productivity trends nationally and 
globally to a new higher track, or whether we are merely observing some unusual variations 
within the context of an otherwise conventional business cycle expansion.” 
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Wynne (2002) notes that not until 1998 did indications appear that the FOMC was 
becoming  confident of an increase in trend productivity.  In the February 1998 Monetary 
Policy Report to the Congress, the Board staff wrote:  
 
“Although the average rate of productivity increase since the 1980s still is only a little above 1 
percent per year, the data for the past two years provide hopeful indications that sustained higher 
levels of investment in new technologies may finally be translating into a stronger trend.” 
 
In the July 1998 Report, the Board noted that productivity growth had picked up—to 
approximately 1½ percent per year on average over the previous three years, due in part  
to increases capital deepening and total factor productivity (the latter are obvious, of 
course, since capital deepening and TFP, by construction, account of most of increases in 
labor productivity!).  The February 1999 Monetary Policy Report noted that while 
transitory factors had contributed to recent performance, technology-related increases in 
productivity were also important and suggested that some of the gains would be 
permanent:   
 “…reasons for thinking that the trend might have picked up to some degree are becoming more 
compelling in view of the incoming data. The 1998 gain in output per hour was particularly 
impressive in this regard, in part because it came at a time when many businesses were diverting 
resources to correct the Y2K problem, a move that likely imposed a bit of drag on growth of 
output per hour. Higher rates of capital formation are raising the growth of capital per worker, and 
workers are likely becoming more skilled in employing the new technologies. Businesses not only 
are increasing their capital inputs but are also continuing to implement changes to their 
organizational structures and operating procedures that might enhance efficiency and bolster profit 
margins.” 
 
The minutes of the February 1999 FOMC meeting noted that  
 
“…the conjuncture over an extended period of strong economic growth, very low rates of 
unemployment, and the absence of any buildup of inflation could not be explained in terms of 
normal historical relationships. While temporary factors, such as declining oil prices, had played a 
role in depressing inflation, the persistence of very low inflation under these conditions most 
likely also resulted form more lasting changes in economic relationships. These were perhaps best 
evidenced by the widespread inability of business firms to raise prices because of strong 
competitive pressures in domestic and global markets and the related efforts to hold down costs, 
including labor costs. Contributing importantly to the success of those cost-saving efforts were the 
continued rapid growth of increasingly efficient business capital. The accumulation of such capital 
evidently had greatly enhanced productivity in a broad range of economic activities.”  
 
The July 1999 Monetary Policy Report noted that productivity had increased at a 2 
percent annual rate since 1995 “…well above the trend of roughly 1 percent per year that 
had prevailed over the preceding two decades.” Again the Board cautioned against 
interpreting all of the increase as a change in trend, but noted that it may be part of a 
“…more persistent payoff from a boom in business investment …over the past several 
years.”   At the October meeting, the FOMC noted that “A great deal of uncertainty 
surrounded the behavior of productivity growth going forward”, at the December meeting 
they also noted that “…they saw no indications that the impressive gains in productivity 
might be moderating.”  The February 2000 Monetary Policy Report noted that the 
performance of the economy over the course of the year would depend crucially on the 
course of productivity. The Board noted that many firms were         
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“…still in the process of implementing technologies that have proved effective in reorganizing 
internal operations …[and]…in gaining speedier access to outside resources and markets” while 
the technologies themselves continued to advance at a rapid pace. As a result, the Board argued 
that “…a further increase in productivity growth from the average pace of recent years also is 
possible.”  
 
In his comments, Chairman Greenspan noted the  
 
“… distinct possibility …that the development and diffusion of new technologies in the current 
wave of innovation may still be at a relatively early stage and that the scope forth further 




 The July 2000 Monetary Policy Report cautioned that  
 
“…a portion of the very rapid rise in measured productivity in recent quarters may be a result of 
the cyclical characteristics of this expansion rather than an indication of structural rates of 
increase…” but also pointed out that “…the acceleration of productivity in the past several years 
has exceeded the pickup in output growth over the period and, thus, does not appear to be simply 
a cyclical response to more rapidly rising demand. Rather, businesses are likely realizing 
substantial and lasting payoffs from their investment in equipment and processes that embody the 
technological advances of the past several years.”  
 
By mid-2000, the US economy had begun the desired slowdown.  In the July Monetary 
Policy Report, Chairman Greenspan said 
 
“…the more important question for the longer-term economic outlook is the extent of any 
productivity slowdown that might accompany a more subdued pace of production and consumer 
spending, should it persist. The behavior of productivity under such circumstances will be a 
revealing test of just how much  of the rapid growth of productivity in recent years has 
represented structural change as distinct from cyclical aberrations and, hence, how truly different 
the developments of the past five years have been…. So far there is little evidence to undermine 
the notion that most of the productivity increase of recent years has been structural and that 
structural productivity may be accelerating.” 
 
Interestingly, this “waiting and watching” model for separating cycle from trend is the 
same test discussed by the Board staff during the 1980s. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Since 1995, estimates of the economy’s long-run, or structural, rate of labor 
productivity growth have increased significantly.  After having increased at about a 1.4 
percent annual rate from 1973 to 1994, the current sustainable pace of labor productivity        
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growth in the nonfarm business sector is widely believed to be from one-half to 1 
percentage point higher. 
Recognition during the mid-1990s of the acceleration of productivity was delayed 
by weaknesses in measuring productivity.  Initial aggregate data for 1995 and 1996, for 
example, showed little increase in measured productivity.  Relying on anecdotal 
evidence, and conviction that the data was incomplete, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan thought otherwise.  Although both anecdotal observations at individual firms 
and available data on business investment spending (which suggested that rapidly falling 
semiconductor and computer prices were encouraging significant capital deepening), not 
until mid-1997 did revised data for 1995 and 1996 display gains in productivity growth.  
Our analysis suggests that such measurement delays and revisions are not uncommon.   
Our analysis highlights the difficulties in formulating monetary policy using 
preliminary, incoming data.  Policymakers should be—and are—wary about placing too 
much faith in initial estimates because data revisions often have significantly challenged 
the perceptions that policymakers previous held in “real time.”         
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Decomposition of Average Labor Productivity Growth for the Business Sector 
          
      Growth for Periods Indicated 





     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Output per Hour           
Business      3.23  1.58  3.14  2.55 
  Nonfarm Business      2.77  1.48  3.05  2.29 
    Manufacturing      2.58  2.59  5.01  2.98 
      Durable      2.64  3.02  6.33  3.39 
      Nondurable      2.83  1.90  3.49  2.56 
  Nonfinancial Corporate Business  2.61  1.41  3.76  2.25 
            
Output            
Business      4.10  3.18  4.04  3.72 
  Nonfarm Business      4.22  3.17  4.05  3.77 
    Manufacturing      3.74  2.51  2.48  3.04 
      Durable      4.21  2.87  4.18  3.66 
      Nondurable      3.48  1.90  0.36  2.32 
  Nonfinancial Corporate Business  5.51  3.25  4.78  4.27 
            
Hours            
Business      0.84  1.57  0.87  1.14 
  Nonfarm Business      1.41  1.67  0.98  1.44 
    Manufacturing      1.14  -0.09  -2.40  0.06 
      Durable      1.53  -0.15  -2.02  0.27 
      Nondurable      0.63  0.00  -3.02  -0.23 
  Nonfinancial Corporate Business  2.86  1.81  0.99  1.99 
          
NOTE: Compounded annual growth rates using quarterly data; 1949:Q1 to 1972:Q4;  
            1972:Q4 to 1994:Q4; 1994:Q4 to 2004:Q4.  Data for nonfinancial    
            corporations begins in 1958:Q1         
            Data for total manufacturing and durable and nondurable manufacturing are on  
            an SIC basis prior to 1987.         
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics       
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Table 2 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
        





                                                  
Effect of Annual NIPA Revisions on Measured Growth of Labor Productivity, Output, and Hours in 
the Nonfarm Business Sector 
[Pre-and Post-Benchmark figures as published in the BLS  Productivity and Cost Report] 
(Percent Change at a Compound Annual Rate) 
                      




Initial Revised Diff.    Initial Revised Diff.    Initial Revised Diff. 
1994 2.55  2.36  -0.19    3.99  4.12  0.13    1.40 1.70  0.30 
1995 1.72  1.68  -0.04    4.70  4.85  0.15    2.87 3.09  0.22 
1996 0.83  0.57  -0.26    2.92  2.84  -0.08    2.03 2.28  0.25 
1997 0.75  0.88  0.13    3.21  3.33  0.12    2.40 2.44  0.04 
1998 1.55  2.06  0.51    4.15  4.76  0.61    2.60 2.64  0.04 
1999 2.31  2.60  0.29    4.44  4.74  0.30    2.38 2.42  0.04 
2000 3.30  3.30  0.00    5.41  5.51  0.10    2.06 2.13  0.07 
2001 3.05  2.28  -0.77    4.28  3.60  -0.68    1.16 1.27  0.11 
2002 3.08  2.71  -0.37    2.00  1.44  -0.56    -1.08 -1.27  -0.19 
2003 2.87  3.60  0.73    1.56  1.50  -0.06    -1.27 -2.02  -0.75 
2004 4.69  4.45  -0.24    4.33  4.23  -0.10    -0.38 -0.23  0.15 
2005 3.97  3.68  -0.29    4.76  4.59  0.17    0.76 0.87  0.11 
                    
Average Revision:    -0.04        0.01        0.03 
0.32 0.26  0.19  Average Absolute Revision: 
  
     
  
     
  
                    
* NOTE:  The NIPA Revision Period is the nine quarters up to and including the first quarter of the year 
indicated.  The year indicated is the year of publication of the NIPA revision, usually July or August. The 
1999 NIPA revision, more extensive than most, incorporated the Oct. 28, 1999, introduction of computer 
software into business fixed investment. This resulted in revisions back to 1959. Nevertheless, for 
consistency, the revisions shown here are for the nine quarters ending in the first quarter of the year 
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Table 4 
               
Initially Published vs Most-Recently Published Growth Rates  
of Nonfarm Labor Productivity 
(quarterly, percent annual rate, 1985:Q3 to 2005:Q1) 
 
Each figure is equal to the initially published growth rate  
minus the most-recently published growth rate, for the span indicated. 
 
 
Growth from Preceding Period (quarterly, percent annual rate) 
 
               
    Output per Hour  Output  Hours 
            















Business Sector  0.41 1.82 0.38 1.59 -0.02  1.10 
  Nonfarm     0.34 1.84 -0.08 1.58 0.12  1.06 
    Manufacturing  0.04 2.20 -0.07 1.72 -0.07  1.30 
      Durable  -0.16 2.79 -0.13 2.18 0.05 1.46 
      Nondurable  0.18 2.34 -0.11 1.85 -0.24  1.40 
  Nonfinancial Corporate  -0.09 2.05 -0.10 1.85 -0.02  1.06 
               
 
Growth from Corresponding Period One-Year Earlier (quarterly, percent annual rate) 
 
              
    Output per Hour  Output Hours 
            















Business Sector  0.26 1.05 0.24 0.83 -0.02  0.64 
  Nonfarm     0.02 1.02 -0.05 0.82 0.04  0.64 
    Manufacturing  -0.16 1.46 -0.19 0.94 -0.01  0.78 
      Durable  -0.36 1.91 -0.27 1.42 0.11 0.85 
      Nondurable  -0.13 1.15 -0.36 0.78 -0.21  0.85 
  Nonfinancial Corporate  -0.04 1.15 -0.05 1.08 -0.02  0.72 
               
 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Productivity and Cost. 
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Table 5 
 
Change in CBO Projections of Structural Labor Productivity Growth and Potential Real 























      
2005 2005-2015  2.4  2.9 
2004 2004-2014  2.2  2.8 
2003 2003-2013  2.2  2.9 
2002 2002-2012  2.2  3.1 
2001 2001-2011  2.7  3.3 
2000 1999-2010  2.3  3.1 
1999 1998-2009  1.8  2.5 
1998 1997-2008  1.5  2.3 
1997  1996-2007 1.1  2.1 
Addenda:       
Actual Growth 
Rate 
1973-1996 1.0  3.0 
 
SOURCES:  The Budget and Economic Outlook, Congressional Budget Office, various years. For 
example, 2005 estimates taken from Table 2-2, p. 45 (January 2005 Outlook). 
 
a.  CBO projections were published in January and completed in November or December of the 
previous year. 
b.  Nonfarm Business Sector 
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Figure 1
Nonfarm Labor Productivity

















NBER’s business cycle dating committee on November 26, 2001, selected the first quarter of 2001 as the 
cyclical peak.  The business-cycle average is calculated as the mean of the nine NBER post-World War II 
business cycles, excluding the 1980 recession and the 2001 recession.          




Contributions to Labor Productivity Growth and Relative 





















Contr. From Capital Deepening Contribution from MFP Percent Change in Relative Semiconductor Prices
Right Axis
SOURCE: Productivity data, Dan Sichel (via e-mail); semiconductor prices, Bureau of Labor Statistics       
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   Figure 3 
 
   Labor Productivity Growth, Nonfarm Business Sector 
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Figure 5
Labor Productivity Growth, 1995
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Figure 6
Labor Productivity Growth, 1996
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Figure 7  
Revisions to Estimates of Labor Productivity Growth, 1959-2003 
 
 
SOURCE: Council of Economic Advisers, various issues       
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Figure 7 
Greenbook Labor Productivity Forecasts, 1997-2000        
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Figure 9 
Nonfarm Business Sector Labor Productivity Growth 
Estimates 
(Four-Quarter Growth Rate)      
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Figure 10     
Nonfinancial Corporate Business Labor Productivity Growth 
Estimates     
(Four-Quarter Growth Rate) 
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